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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 13-1219 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CALVIN LEE DYE, 
                       Appellant  
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(Crim. No. 2-08-cr-00384-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Alan N. Bloch 
 
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 31, 2014 
 
BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR., and 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: August 26, 2015) 
 
OPINION* 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
 Calvin Lee Dye appeals the denial of the motion he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2255, in which he alleged, inter alia, that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
by failing to advise him of the consequences of going to trial and failing to advise him to 
enter a guilty plea.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the district court. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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I. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS  
AND DIRECT APPEAL1 
 Dye was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Count 1), and 18 U.S.C. § 
2423(b) (Count 2).  At trial, Dye admitted his guilt to Count 2.  However, he challenged 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Count 1 and argued that the female he 
contacted was a “seductress” who persuaded, induced, and enticed him, not the other way 
around.  The jury rejected this theory and found Dye guilty on both counts. 
 Using the 2008 Guidelines Manual, the Presentence Report (“PSR”) applied 
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 and three enhancements to both of Dye’s counts of conviction.           
(PSR ¶¶ 14, 15, 16.) Dye’s adjusted offense level was 34, including three enhancements.  
(PSR ¶¶ 14-16.) These enhancements resulted from the offense involving a minor 
between the ages of 12 and 16 (§ 2G2.1(b)(1)(B)), Dye’s masturbation in front of his web 
camera (§ 2G2.1(b )(2)(a)) and because the offense involved use of a computer (§ 
2G2.1(b)(6))(2)(B)). 
 However, the PSR also applied § 2G1.3(c)(1) which applies when the crime 
involves “causing . . . offering or seeking . . . a minor to engage in sexually explicit 
conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct[.]”  When those 
                                              
1 Inasmuch as we are writing only for the parties, we will not set forth the procedural 
history or evidence produced at trial except insofar as is helpful to our discussion.  
However, a more detailed recitation of the history and underlying facts are set out in the 
NPO affirming Dye’s conviction on direct appeal.  See United States v. Dye, 2010 WL 
4146187 (3d Cir. Oct. 22, 2010). 
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circumstances are present, § 2G1.3(c)(1) directs the court to apply § 2G2.1.  (PSR ¶ 16.) 
The Commentary to the latter instructs that the cross-reference: 
 is to be construed broadly and includes all instances in which the offense 
involved employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, coercing, 
transporting, permitting, or offering or seeking by notice, advertisement or 
other method, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the 
purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct.   
 
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(c)(1), cmt. n.5(A).  The result was a base offense level of 32 (PSR ¶¶ 
16, 17.)  With the three 2-level enhancements, Dye’s total offense level became 38, with 
a criminal history category of I, in order to reflect that both the base offense level and 
criminal history category determine the Guidelines range.   The resulting Guideline range 
was 235-293 months imprisonment.2  
However, the district court granted Dye’s motion for a downward variance 
because it found that a sentence within the 235-293 advisory Guidelines range was “too 
severe.”  The district court determined that a sentence that was significantly lower than 
the Guidelines range but “five years higher than the statutory minimum” was adequate to 
address the concerns outlined in 18 § 3553(a).   Thus, Dye was sentenced to 180 months 
imprisonment, to be followed by 10 years of supervised release.   
Dye filed a timely appeal in which he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support his conviction on Count 1 and also argued that the district court erred when it 
applied the cross-reference at U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(c)(1).  In a NPO, we affirmed the 
                                              
2   The range for Count 1 was 120 months imprisonment to life, and Count 2 had a 
maximum term of 30 years imprisonment. 
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judgment of conviction and sentence.  United States v. Dye, 2010 WL 4146187 (3d Cir. 
Oct. 22, 2010).   
II. MOTION FOR COLLATERAL RELIEF 
On September 28, 2011, Dye filed this pro se § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or 
correct his sentence.  He alleged that prior counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to 
advise him of the consequences of the cross-reference contained in § 2G1.3(c)(1) prior to 
sentencing; (2) failing to argue on direct appeal that Amendment 732 to the Guidelines 
should retroactively apply to him to give him a two-level reduction in his overall offense 
level; and (3) failing to investigate his mental capacity and request a competency 
hearing.3   The district court denied Dye’s § 2255 motion without a hearing and declined 
to issue a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”).  United States v. Dye, 2013 WL 24805 
(W.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2013). 
 Dye filed a Notice of Appeal, which we construed as an application for a COA.  
We entered the following order granting the COA in part as follows:  
The certificate is granted as to [Dye’s] claim that, but for 
counsel’s alleged failure to advise him of the applicability of 
the cross-reference contained in U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(c)(1), he 
would have pled guilty and received a three-level reduction 
for acceptance of responsibility.  See United States v. Day, 
969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).  We deny [Dye’s] request for 
a certificate of appealability on all other grounds because, 
essentially for the reasons explained by the District Court, 
jurists of reason would not debate the District Court’s 
                                              
3 Amendment 732 notes that § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)’s undue influence enhancement should not 
be applied in a case where the only “minor” involved in the offence is an undercover law 
enforcement officer.  See U.S.S.G 2A3.2 cmt. n.3(B).  
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disposition of those claims.  See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 
473, 484 (2000).   
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 Dye contends that if trial counsel had informed him of the cross-reference, he 
would have pled guilty and received a three-level reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), which would have resulted in a base offense level 
of 35 and a criminal history category of I.  A base offense level of 35 yields an advisory 
Guidelines range of 168-210 months.  Dye claims this establishes ineffectiveness of 
counsel and prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).4 
 Dye does not contest the applicability of U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(c)(1) and its cross-
reference, § 2G2.1.  It applied whether he pled guilty or was convicted at a trial.  
A.5  
  
 Assuming that Dye’s trial counsel had told him about the cross-reference and 
advised him to plead guilty, and assuming that Dye had pled guilty and received the 
three-level reduction for responsibility, his adjusted offense level would have been 35, 
which, together with his criminal history category of I, would have yielded an advisory 
Guidelines range of 168-210 months.   The sentence of 180 months imprisonment that the 
district court imposed is a mid-range sentence within the advisory range that would have 
                                              
4 “We exercise plenary review over the legal component of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  The underlying facts are reviewed for clear error, and are subject 
to independent judgment on whether the facts thus found constitute constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”  United States v. Smack, 347 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 
2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
5 For purposes of this part of our analysis, we assume that Dye would have entered an 
“open” plea had he been properly informed about the cross-reference in the guidelines. 
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applied had Dye pled guilty and received the three-level reduction.  Accordingly, Dye 
cannot establish the prejudice required under Strickland, even assuming that trial counsel 
was deficient in not informing him of the applicability of the cross-reference and not 
advising him to enter a guilty plea.    
Although Dye claims that he can establish prejudice, his argument is as conclusory 
as it is unconvincing.  Dye contends that the180-- month sentence that was imposed 
reflected the district court’s consideration of the fact that Dye did not accept 
responsibility and instead proceeded to trial.  Dye’s Br. at 15.   The argument is based 
entirely on a portion of the Statement of Reasons filed by the district court after it 
imposed sentence.  In Section VIII of the Statement of Reasons, the district court noted, 
inter alia, “defendant’s failure to accept responsibility require[s] a sentence significantly 
above the statutory minimum.”  Dye concludes that without the claimed heavy emphasis 
the district court placed on his failure to accept responsibility that he would have received 
a “three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility . . . and [the court] would have 
imposed the mandatory minimum sentence.”6  Dye’s Br. at 16.  
 However, Dye’s argument is without merit because it is clear that the district 
court’s sentence of 180 months (5 years above the mandatory minimum) was not based 
solely on Dye not accepting responsibility.  At Dye’s sentencing hearing, the district 
court said that it did “agree with [Dye] that under the circumstances of this case, the 
Guidelines provide too severe of a sentence.”  App. 144.  It also said that § 2G2.1 “fails 
                                              
6 As noted earlier, the mandatory minimum sentence was 10 years (120 months) on 
Count 1.   
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to properly reflect the Section 3553(a) considerations,” and a “sentence significantly 
lower would more adequately address those factors.”  Id.  To its credit, the district court 
explained why a sentence that was less severe than that recommended by the Guidelines 
would satisfactorily serve the court’s concerns and the sentencing factors in § 3553.  The 
care and thoroughness of the court’s deliberations in imposing sentence is evident in the 
explanation it gave and we will therefore take the liberty of quoting the sentencing 
transcript at length.  The court explained: 
While the need to deter crimes aimed at children such as 
those committed by the Defendant is great, a sentence of 
imprisonment of over 10 years, the statutory minimum in this 
case, would more than adequately deter most potential 
perpetrators. 
 
Few people would be unaffected by the prospect of spending 
no less than a decade in prison even without having a prior 
criminal record for committing such crimes.  Likewise, while 
there is also a need to protect the public, and especially young 
girls from the Defendant, a lengthy term of supervised release 
with strict conditions following incarceration will allow the 
Court and the probation officer to monitor and regulate the 
Defendants’ behavior well after his release. Further, the 
amount of rehabilitation that Defendant experiences will 
likely differ little, if at all, if he serves more than 10 years but 
less than 20 years in prison.   
 
Finally, the Defendant’s history and characteristics do not 
support a sentence as much above the already high statutory 
minimum sentence as suggested by the Guidelines.  The 
conduct in this case involve[d] fairly elaborate preparation by 
the Defendant. 
 
In regard to his plan to meet and have sex and photograph a 
minor and involved very graphic language and behavior 
including masturbating on-line to entice who the Defendant 
believed to be a 14-year-old girl, this conduct along with 
[D]efendant’s failure to accept full responsibility for his 
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criminal conduct calls for a sentence significantly above the 
statutory minimum. 
 
Based upon the Section 3553(a) factors, they do not call . . . 
for sentences as high as the extremely high sentence 
recommended by the Guidelines.  A sentence several years 
higher that the statutory minimum would meet these 
concerns.  While there may well be cases of this nature where 
the Guidelines do provide for a reasonable sentence, this is 
not one of them. 
 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the policy supporting 
section 2G2.1 of the Guidelines does not apply to the facts of 
this case.  Instead, a sentence five years higher than the 
statutory minimum is sufficient but not greater than necessary 
to comply with the Section 3553(a) factors.  Therefore, . . .the 
Court will vary from the recommended guidelines [and 
sentence Dye] to a term of imprisonment of 180 months at 
each of Counts 1 and 2 to be served concurrently. 
 
************* 
 
Mr. Dye, although the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
recommend a sentence ranging from 235 to 293 months, the 
Court for the reasons already stated has decided to sentence 
you to a term of imprisonment of 180 months because this 
sentence adequately addresses the seriousness of your 
offenses. 
 
 It is therefore abundantly clear that Dye’s conduct and the district court’s analysis 
of the § 3553(a) factors drove his sentence, not the fact that he proceeded to trial and did 
not accept responsibility.7  For these reasons, Dye cannot establish the prejudice prong of 
Strickland.  
                                              
7 To the extent that there is a conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncements at 
sentencing and the written explanation in the Statement of Reasons, the oral 
pronouncements control.  See, e.g., United States v. Chasmer, 952 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 
1991) (It is a “firmly established and settled principle of federal criminal law that an 
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 However, there are circumstances present here which need further elaboration and 
discussion.  Until now, the analysis of Dye’s appeal has proceeded on the assumption that 
Dye would have entered an “open” plea and received the three-level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility had his trial counsel properly advised him of the applicability 
of the § 2G1.3(c)(1) cross-reference.   But, the government notes that it did extend a 
formal offer to Dye’s trial counsel to enter into a guilty plea in March 2009, and then 
later provided trial counsel with a document, dated May 2009, to serve as a discussion 
tool for plea negotiations.   
 The government has provided these plea documents in its supplemental appendix.  
It is evident, however, that these documents were not included in the record before the 
district court.  Therefore, we may not consider them in our review.  See In re Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc.’s Application for Access to Sealed Transcripts, 913 F.2d 89, 96 (3d Cir. 
1990).  In light of the government’s submission, Dye requests that we remand the case to 
the district court so that he can file an amended motion incorporating the documents and 
so that the district court may conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the purported plea 
offers.  We nevertheless decline to remand because – as explained below – these 
documents could not possibly form a basis for the relief Dye seeks. 
 In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985), the Supreme Court held that 
Strickland applies “to ineffective-assistance claims arising out of the plea process.”  More 
recently, and particularly relevant here, the Supreme Court held that, “as a general rule, 
                                                                                                                                                  
orally pronounced sentence controls over a judgment and commitment order when the 
two conflict.”) (citation omitted).   
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defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to 
accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”  Missouri v. 
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).   “When defense counsel allow[s] the offer to expire 
without advising the defendant [of the offer] or allowing him to consider it, defense 
counsel [does] not render the effective assistance the Constitution requires.”  Id. at 1409.   
 When defense counsel fails to communicate a formal offer to the defendant and 
the offer lapses, counsel’s performance is deficient under Strickland.  Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 
1409.  The Court in Frye explained what is required to show prejudice in that situation: 
To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel 
where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of 
counsel’s deficient performance, defendants must 
demonstrate a reasonable probability they would have 
accepted the plea offer had they been afforded effective 
assistance of counsel.  Defendants must also demonstrate a 
reasonable probability the plea would have been entered 
without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing 
to accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that 
discretion under . . . law.  To establish prejudice in this 
instance, it is necessary to show a reasonable probability that 
the end result of the criminal process would have been more 
favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence 
of less prison time. 
 
Id.  
 As noted, the government submits that on March 27, 2009, it sent Dye’s trial 
counsel a formal offer, as that term is described in Missouri v. Frye, supra, to enter into a 
guilty plea.  The government submits that the March 27, 2009, plea agreement was sent 
to Dye’s trial counsel on April 1, 2009.  The March 27, 2009 offer included a three-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility and – assuming that the § 2G1.3(c)(1) cross-
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reference would have applied – acceptance of the offer would have resulted in an 
advisory Guidelines range of 168-210 months.  This offer, if accepted by Dye and the 
district court, would have put Dye in the same position he claims he would have been in 
had trial counsel given him the advice he claims that trial counsel did not give him.  
 The government notes that although the March 2009 offer was communicated to 
trial counsel, it concedes that there is no record evidence that trial counsel communicated 
the offer to Dye.  Moreover, there is no mention of the March 2009 offer in the district 
court’s opinion disposing of Dye’s § 2255 motion.   
 In any event, the March 2009 offer, if Dye had been aware of it and had he and the 
district court accepted it, would not affect the outcome of his appeal.  As noted, the plea 
offer would have yielded an advisory Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months.  That is the 
same Guidelines range that Dye would have been in had he entered an “open” plea and 
received the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  And, as also noted, 
the sentence he did receive after proceeding to trial – 180 months – is a mid-range 
sentence within 168 to 210 months.  Given the district court’s care and explanation of the 
sentence that was imposed, Dye cannot establish that a guilty plea pursuant to the March 
2009 plea offer would have had a reasonable probability of achieving a different 
sentence. Therefore, assuming for argument’s sake that trial counsel did not inform Dye 
of the March 2009 plea agreement, Dye suffered no prejudice.   
The existence of the May 1, 2009 draft plea agreement provides no solace to Dye 
either.  On appeal, the government takes pains to argue that a document that was sent to 
defense counsel on May 1, 2009 was a draft, and neither intended as a formal plea offer, 
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nor communicated as one.  According to the government, that document was merely an 
invitation to engage in plea negotiations in the form of a draft plea agreement.  The 
government argues: 
In May 2009, the Government forwarded to Dye’s trial counsel an 
invitation to engage in plea negotiations in the form of a draft plea 
agreement.   The document was prominently labeled “DRAFT,” did 
not bear the signature of the then – U.S. Attorney, and was 
accompanied by an email from the prosecutor stating that it was a 
draft and that it had not been approved by the U.S. Attorney. The 
document included a stipulation that the cross-reference of U.S.S.G. § 
2 G1.3(c)(1) would not apply (but this stipulation would not be 
binding on the District Court) and that the 3-level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility would apply. 
 
The May 2009 draft plea agreement raised the possibility that Dye could have entered a 
plea without the application of § 2G1.3(c)(1), which would have resulted in a base 
offense level of 34, which would yield an advisory Guidelines range of 108-135 months.8  
There is nothing in the record to indicate, what, if anything, happened to the May 2009 
document.  In any event, the draft plea agreement was not a “formal offer,” and the Court 
in Frye was careful to limit counsel’s obligation to disclose to “formal” plea agreements. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the district court. 
  
 
  
                                              
8 Of course, the Guidelines range would have to be revised to 120 – 135 months because 
of the applicable statutory minimum of 10 years on Count 1. 
